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Peterson: Defense Attorneys as Government Informants: Strangers in a Stran

DEFENSE ATTORNEYS AS GOVERNMENT
INFORMANTS: STRANGERS IN A STRANGE
LAND?
INTRODUCTION

If the Government becomes a law-breaker, it breeds contempt

for law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself;
it invites anarchy. To declare that in the administration of
the criminal law the end justifies the means-to declare that
the Government may commit crimes in order to secure the
conviction of a private criminal-would bring terrible retribution.1

As described by one commentator, United States v. Ofshe2 is
truly a "story without heroes."3 Ronald Ofshe was arrested in
December 1982 on charges of possession with intent to distribute
cocaine.4 At that time he retained the services of local Florida
counsel, Melvin Black. 5 In February 1983 he also retained the
services of out-of-state counsel, Marvin Glass.6 Glass, a Chicago
attorney, was retained to assume "a lead counsel position with
respect to communications with the prosecution and plea
negotiations. "7
Shortly after his representation of Ofshe commenced, Glass
was informed by the United States Attorney's Office that Glass
himself was the target of a criminal investigation.s In response,
Glass offered his services in "identifying and investigating
1. Olmstead v. United States. 277 U.S. 438. 485 (1928) (Brandeis. J .• dissenting).
2. 817 F.2d 1508 (11th Cir. 1987).
3. Berg. Shallow Ruling Trespasses on Client Confidentiality. Fulton Co. Daily Rep .•
Sept. 2. 1987. at 2. col. 1.
4. United States v. Ofshe. 817 F.2d at 1510.
5. !d.
6. Petition for Certiorari at 4, United States v. Ofshe, 817 F.2d 1508 (11th Cir.) (No.
87-407), cert. denied. 108 S. Ct. 451 (1987).
7.Id.
8. OfsIte. 817 F.2d at 1511. Glass' criminal indictment resulted from Operation Greylord. "a three and one-half year undercover investigation of corruption in the Cook County
court system conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. United States Attorney
for the Northern District of Illinois, and the Cook County State's Attorney." Note. The
Greylord Im.:estigation Guidelines: Protection for Greylord Attorneys? 16 Loy. U. Cm. L.J.
641. 641 n.l (1985).
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suspected drug traffickers" to Assistant U.S. Attorney Scott
Turow of the U.S. Attorney's Office in Chicago, Illinois.9 By June
1983 Glass even had suggested his client, Ofshe, as a possible
target for the investigation.lO To this end, Turow "sought and
received permission to place a Nagra body bug on Glass and to
conduct an electronic surveillance of the conversations between
Glass and his client."ll
Glass continued to represent Ofshe in this manner for ten more
months with the knowledge of Turow, the U.S Attorney for the
Southern District of Florida, and the presiding trial judge. I2
Ultimately, Ofshe's motions to suppress the evidence13 and to
dismiss the indictmentI 4 were denied. He was convicted of
possession with intent to distribute cocaine and sentenced to four
years in the penitentiary. 15
While expressing grave constitutional concerns, the Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed Ofshe's conviction. I6
The court held that Glass' ineffective representation of Ofshe did
not prejudice the defendant; that the government intrusion in
9. O/sM, 817 F.2d at 1511.
10. [d.
11. !d. A Nagra body bug is a surveillance device which is placed on an individual to

monitor conversations and provide a taped recording of the conversations. See Petition
for Certiorari, supra note 6, at 4-5.
12. O/sM, 817 F.2d at 1511. Upon learning of Glass' conflict in February of 1984, the
trial judge ordered the U.S. Attorney to notify Ofshe that Glass was acting as a
government informant against him. However, Glass' appeal of the judge's order resulted
in keeping the court file on this matter sealed until February of 1985. [d.
13. Ofshe filed a motion to suppress evidence obtained by the government, claiming
that his fourth amendment rights were violated because the warrant was issued by and
directed to be executed by the same individual. Furthermore, Ofshe contended that the
warrant contained insufficient information regarding the reliability of the government
informant and the description of the premises to be searched. [d. at 1513-14. According
to the appellate court, the district court properly rejected Ofshe's fourth amendment
claim because "[t]he errors assailed were those of form, not of substance." [d. at 1514.
See also Seventeenth Annual Review 0/ Criminal Procedure: United States Supreme Court
and Courts 0/ Appeals 1986-1987, 76 GEO. L.J. 521, 549 n.151 (1988), citing O/she for the
proposition that a "warrant naming only one business in multiple use commercial building
[was] valid when officers had no reason to know premises subdivided into separate
offices." [d.
14. Ofshe's motions to dismiss for violations of due process and the right to counsel
were filed on July 15, 1985. Petition for Certiorari, supra note 6, at 3. The motion was
filed following attorney Black's receipt of a letter from Chief Assistant U.S. Attorney
Joseph McSorley, on February 16, 1985, informing him that Glass was a government
informant who had taped a conversation with Ofshe while acting as his counsel. Ofshe,
817 F.2d at 1512.
15. See Berg, supra note 3, at 2, col. 1.
16. O/sM, 817 F.2d at 1517.
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this case did not prejudice Ofshe; and that there was no conflict
of interest which worked to Ofshe's prejudiceP
Ofshe's basic contention on appeal was that the government's
use of his attorney as an informant against him warranted a
reversal of his conviction because such action violates both the
sixth amendment right to counsel and the fifth amendment right
to due process.1S Ofshe's sixth amendment claim challenged the
constitutionality of government intrusion into the attorney-client
relationship, asserting that such intrusion resulted in both
ineffective representation and a conflict of interest.19 Ofshe's fifth
amendment claim focused on the questionable methods employed
by the government to obtain information concerning Ofshe's
activities.20
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit examined and
summarily disposed of Ofshe's fifth and sixth amendment claims
with little more than cursory analysis. This Comment briefly
discusses the fifth amendment issue raised, but primarily focuses
on the potential implications of the court of appeals' analysis of
the sixth amendment's guarantee of right to counsel. In reexamining these claims, it is interesting to note the juxtaposition
of the court's recognition of the egregious facts of this case21
with its decision that Ofshe suffered no harm from either his
defense counsel's or the government's activities.
1.

SIXTH AMENDMENT ISSUES

The sixth amendment provides in part that "[i]n all criminal
prosecutions the accused shall . . . have the assistance of counsel
for his defense."22 The United States Supreme Court has long
held that this constitutional right to counsel is the right to
"effective assistance of competent counsel."23 To this end, the
17. ld. at 1516.
18. ld. at 1515-16.
19. ld. at 1515.

20. ld. at 1516.
21. The court acknowledged its belief "that Glass' and Turow's conduct was reprehensible." ld. at 1516 n.6.
22. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
23. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970). See also Reece v. Georgia, 350
U.S. 85, 90 (1955) (denial of counsel before grand jury indictment violated constitutional
requisite of due process which states must recognize}, Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S.
60, 70 (1942) (" 'assistance of counsel' guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment contemplates
that such assistance be untrammeled and unimpaired"); Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444,
446 (1940) (right of criminal defendant to assistance of counsel includes not only formal
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(k) providing suitable programmes keeping in view the

special needs of the minorities and tribal communities;

(1) taking special steps to protect the interests of children,
the blind, the aged, the handicapped and other vulnerable
Sections of the people;
(m) promoting national integration by broadcasting in a
manner that facilitates communication in the languages in
India; and facilitating the distribution of regional broadcasting services in every State in the languages of that
State;
(n) providing comprehensive broadcast coverage through

the choice of appropriate technology and the best utilisation of the broadcast frequencies available and ensuring
high quality reception;
(0) promoting research and development activities in or-

der to ensure that radio and television broadcast technology are constantly updated; and

(P) expanding broadcasting facilities by establishing additional channels of transmission at various levels.
(3) In particular, and without prejudice to the generality of
the foregoing provisions, the Corporation may take such steps as it
thinks fit(a) to ensure that broadcasting is conducted as a public

service to provide and produce programmes;
(b) to establish a system for the gathering of news for radio and television;
(c) to negotiate for purchase of, or otherwise acquire,
programmes and rights or privileges in respect of sports
and other events, films, serials, occasions, meetings, functions or incidents of public interest, for broadcasting and
to establish procedures for the allocation of such programmes, rights or privileges to the services;

(d) to establish and maintain a library or libraries of radio, television and other materials;

(e) to conduct or commission, from time to time,
programmes, audience research, market or technical service, which may be released to such persons and in such
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manner and subject to such terms and conditions as the
Corporation may think fit;
if) to provide such other services as may be specified by
regulations.
(4) Nothing in sub-sections (2) and (3) shall prevent the Cor':
poration from managing on behalf of the Central Government and
in accordance with such terms and conditions as may be specified
by that Government the broadcasting of External Services and
monitoring of broadcasts made by organisations outside India on
the basis of arrangements made for reimbursement of expenses by
the Central Government.
(5) For the purposes of ensuring that adequate time is made
available for the promotion of the objectives set out in this Section,
the Central Government shall have the power to determine the
maximum limit of broadcast time in respect of the advertisement.
(6) The Corporation shall be subject to no civil liability on the
ground merely that it failed to comply with any of the provisions of
this Section.
(7) The Corporation shall have power to determine and levy
fees and other service charges for or in respect of the advertisements and such programmes as may be specified by regulations:
Provided that the fees and other service charges levied and
collected under this sub-section shall not exceed such limits as may
be determined by the Central Government, from time to time.
13. Parliamentary Committee.-(1) There shall be constituted a Committee consisting of twenty-two Members of Parliament, of whom fifteen from the House of the People to be elected
by the Members thereof and seven from the Council of States to be
elected by the Members thereof in accordance with the system of
proportional representation by means of the single transferable
vote, to oversee that the Corporation discharges its functions in
accordance with the provisions of this Act and, in particular, the
objectives set out in Section 12 and submit a report thereon to
Parliament.
(2) The Committee shall function in accordance with such
rules as may be made by the Speaker of the House of the People.
14. EStablishment of Broadcasting Council, term of office
and removal, etc., of members thereof.-(1) There shall be estab-
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substantial disadvantage to the course of his defense.' "36 The
stricter Supreme Court standard of prejudice entails "a general
requirement that the defendant affirmatively prove prejudice."37
This requirement of proof of actual prejudice has led at least one
commentator to conclude that the standard is too stringent to
provide relief for criminal defendants raising general
ineffectiveness of counsel claims.38
Even when courts acknowledge blatant deficiencies on the part
of an attorney, they have been hesitant in concluding that such
deficiencies prejudiced a defendant.39 Thus, success on the first
prong of the test does not satisfy the complete standard.
Prejudice within the context of an ineffective assistance of
counsel claim has not been clearly defined by the Court. Although
the Court has established prejudice as an element of the test, it
has deliberately failed to specify what constitutes prejudice.40
According to the Strickland Court, a "defendant must show that
there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have
been different."41
Curiously, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals did not apply
the Supreme Court's Strickland test in its analysis of Ofshe's
claims. Although the court clearly conceded that Glass'
representation of Ofshe was deficient,42 it held, without further
elaboration, that Ofshe did not suffer prejudice.43

36. Id. at 682 (quoting Washington v. Strickland. 693 F.2d 1243. 1262 (5th Cir. 1982)).
37. Id. at 693.
38. For a discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of the Strickland test. see Note.
Ineffective Assistance of CQUnsel Claims: Toward a Uniform Framework For Review:
Strickland v. Washington. 50 Mo. L. REV. 651 (1986).
39. See. e.g.• United States v. Mouzin. 785 F.2d 682 (9th Cir. 1986) (disbarment of
defendant's attorney not enough to establish that counsel's assistance to defendant was
ineffectivel. But see United States v. Cancilla. 725 F.2d 867 (2d Cir. 1984) (defendant's
trial counsel held ineffective when. unbeknownst to defendant. counsel engaged in similar
type of criminal activity for which defendant was being tried); Solina v. United States.
709 F.2d 160 (2d Cir. 1983) (failure of defendant's attorney to pass any state bar denied
defendant the effective assistance of counsel).
40. Strickland. 466 U.S. at 688 ("More specific guidelines are not appropriate:·).
41. Id. at 694.
42. United States v. Ofshe. 817 F.2d 1508. 1516 (11th Cir. 1987). The court noted that
"the government allowed the ineffective representation to continue for over 10 months:'
Id. at 1511. See also Appellee's Motion to Amend Panel Opinion at 10. United States v.
Ofshe. 817 F.2d 1508 (11th Cir. 1987) (No. 86-5351). ("In this case. the foreseeable result of
Turow's conduct was that Glass' representation of Ofshe would be rendered ineffective:')'
43. Ofshe. 817 F.2d at 1515. "We reiterate and emphasize that Ofshe suffered no
prejudice as a result of the taped conversation." Id. The court's failure to develop its
reasoning leaves unanswered a crucial question: how could such blatantly ineffective
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Because Ofshe was not examined under the Strickland guidelines,
one avenue of challenging a sixth amendment violation was
automatically closed to Ofshe. The court of appeals could have
analyzed this issue, regardless of whether the Strickland standard
had been raised by Ofshe at the trial level, because the facts
established that such ineffective representation on Glass' part
was apparent.44 The court of appeals readily determined that the
first prong of the Strickland test was met; there was an
acknowledged ineffective representation. 45 If the court had applied
Strickland, it should have determined whether the ineffective
representation by Glass prejudiced Ofshe's defense such that the
result rendered was unreliable. The failure of the Eleventh Circuit
to apply Strickland in a case peculiarly suited to its application
is noteworthy in light of the importance the Supreme Court has
placed on the right to effective representation. 46
B. Government Intrusion into the Attorney-Client Relationship
A second aspect of the sixth amendment guarantee to effective
assistance of counsel is implicated when governmental agents,
including informers, impermissibly intrude into the attorneyclient relationship.47 The Supreme Court addressed this issue in
United States v. Morrison. 48 Defendant Hazel Morrison, indicted
on federal drug charges, retained private counsel. Although
government agents were aware that Morrison was represented
by counsel, they met with her twice without her attorney's
knowledge or permission and urged her to cooperate with the
government in making its case.49 After refusing to cooperate,
Morrison moved to have her indictment dismissed claiming the
governmental intrusion had violated her sixth amendment right
to counsel. The district court denied her motion and the Court
representation not constitute prejudice to Ofshe's defense? The opinion does not address
this question because the court of appeals never applied the standards or reasoning of
Strickland to Ofshe's case. No reference to Strickfllnd appears within the court's opinion.
44. See Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.s. 261 (1981). Justice Powell, writing for the majority,
noted that failure to raise a constitutional issue in the lower cocrt does not preclude the
Court from addressing such an issue "in the interests of justice," when such constitutional
violation is apparent from the record. ld. at 265 n.5.
45. Ofshe, 817 F.2d at 1511. The words "ineffective representation" appear only in the
court's initial reference to Glass' poor representation. ld.
46. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
47. See cases cited supra note 25.
48. 449 U.S. 361 (1981).
49. United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. at 362.
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of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed. 5O The Supreme Court
accepted certiorari and articulated the standard for sixth
amendment claims arising out of governmental intrusion into the
attorney-client relationship.
The Court in Morrison established a fairly stringent two-prong
test for dismissal of an indictment when government agents
violate a defendant's sixth amendment right to effective assistance
of counsel. A defendant must first establish that actions on the
part of the government violated the sixth amendment. 51 Secondly,
the defendant must demonstrate that the violation led to actual
prejudice resulting in an "adverse . . . impact on the criminal
proceedings."52 The practical effect of the Morrison test is that
government intrusion alone into an attorney-client relationship
will not result in automatic dismissal of an indictment absent a
showing of "demonstrable prejudice" to the defendant.53 The
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit espoused this view in
Ofshe.

Although courts have found government activity which was
intrusive enough to constitute reversal of a conviction or
indictment,54 the trend has been to uphold a defendant's conviction
even if a sixth amendment violation by the government has been
established.55 Thus, an ineffective assistance of counsel claim is
50. fd. at 363.
51. fd. at 365.
52. fd.
53. fd. See also Seventeenth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: United States
Supreme Court and Courts of Appeals 1986-1987, 76 GEO. L.J. 921, 945 n.2092 (1988),
referencing the O/she case in support of the Morrison theory that government intrusion alone,
in the absence of proven prejudice, will not warrant dismissal of an indictment.
54. See, e.g., Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220, 231 (1977) ("[p]etitioner's Sixth Amendment
rights were violated by a corporeal identification conducted after the initiation of adversary judicial criminal proceedings and in the absence of counsel."); Geders v. United
States, 425 U.S. 80, 91 (1976) (The trial court's "order preventing petitioner from consulting
his counsel 'about anything' during a 17-hour overnight recess ..• inIpinged upon his
right to the assistance of counsel . . . ."); Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 858 (1975)
(New York statute allowing trial judge to deny defense counsel the right to summation
at close of trial held unconstitutional violation of a criminal defendant's right to counsell;
United States v. Valencia, 541 F.2d 618, 622 (6th Cir. 1976) (government's action in
employing undercover informant acting as secretary to attorney for defendant in drug
prosecution case mandated reversal of conviction and new triall.
55. See, e.g., Morrison, 449 U.S. at 361 (government agents meeting with defendant
without knowledge or permission of her attorney violated her sixth amendment rights
but did not justify dismissal of indictment absent showing of prejudice to counsel's ability
to represent defendant); Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545 (1977) (participation in
pretrial meetings between accused, accused's attorney, and undercover agent did not
unconstitutionally infringe accused's right to effective assistance of counsel even when
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immediately disadvantaged if the only sixth amendment challenge
is tied solely to government action in the case.56 Interestingly,
the court of appeals based most of its sixth amendment analysis
upon this claim. 57 This narrow focus led the court to conclude
that the facts of Ojshe, limited to government action alone, did
not demonstrate the requisite prejudice resulting from the
government's actions and, thus, could not sustain a sixth
amendment challenge based on this singular claim.58
Under Morrison and related cases, it is not surprising that the
Ojshe court found the government's actions to be borderline
constitutional.59 Some courts have subjected government intrusion
claims to very strict standards,60 deferring to the government's
legitimate interest in acting to deter crime and apprehend
criminals.61

undercover agent later testified on behalf of the prosecution); United States v. Melvin,
650 F.2d 641 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981) (codefendant turned informant did not merit dismissal
of defendant's case if some other remedy could be fashioned to vindicate defendant's
right to counsell; United States v. King, 536 F. Supp. 253 (C.D. Cal. 1982) (effective
assistance of counsel did not guarantee confidentiality regarding attorney's criminal
activity on behalf of client).
56. When government conduct leads to violation of the sixth amendment right to
counsel the usual remedy is not dismissal, but rather suppression of evidence so obtained.
See Morrison, 449 U.S. at 365. IT any evidence illegally obtained is not introduced at trial,
as in the O/she case, a government intrusion claim alone is an empty sixth amendment
challenge.
57. The court of appeals cited five cases in its analysis of Ofshe's sixth amendment
claim. Four of these were "government intrusion" cases: Morrison, 449 U.S. 361 (1981)
(prejudice required to effect dismissal of indictment in government intrusion case);
Weatherford, 429 U.S. 547 (1977) (government intrusion results in sixth amendment
violation only if information obtained is communicated to prosecution); Melvin, 650 F.2d
641 (5th Cir. 1981) (absent showing of prejudice, government informant's presence at
strategy meetings between defendant and counsel does not constitute sixth amendment
violation); United States v. Sander, 615 F.2d 215 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 835
(1980) (no sixth amendment violation when police examine file of defendant's murdered
attorney and no information contained therein is utilized by prosecution). O/she, 817 F.2d
at 1515.
58. O/she, 817 F.2d at 1515.
59. However, the court still categorized the government's actions through Assistant
U.S. Attorney Turow as "reprehensible." ld. at 1516 n.6.
60. See, e.g., United States v. King, 536 F. Supp. 253, 258-61 (C.D. Cal. 1982) (district
court formulated a three·prong test to determine whether a government intrusion has,
in fact, undermined a legitimate attorney-client relationship).
61. Morrison, 449 U.S. at 364 ("[W]e have implicitly recognized the necessity for
preserving society's interest in the administration of criminal justice."). Arguably, gov·
ernment action to deter crime and apprehend criminals would be ineffective if the
government were so hamstrung by judicial rules that the government could never intrude
upon the attorney-client relationship, even through constitutionally permissible means.
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Had the facts of Ofshe implicated only the government's activity,
the court of appeals' analysis under Morrison would be more
convincing. However, the flaw in this narrow approach is that
the court's analysis does not address the constitutional concerns
associated with a sixth amendment violation resulting from the
actions of the government concurrent with the actions of the
defendant's attorney.
By focusing primarily on the government's conduct, the Ofshe
court narrowed the sixth amendment question to the single issue
of whether the government's action in taping attorney Glass'
conversation with his client constituted prejudice to Ofshe.62 The
court of appeals noted that the government did not provide
evidence procured from this tape to the prosecutor in Ofshe's
case. 63 Thus, the court's logical conclusion, premised solely on
Morrison, was that Ofshe was not prejudiced by the government's
action.
It is unclear why the Eleventh Circuit concentrated its analysis
solely upon whether the government's action was such that
evidence should be excluded. The court's limited analysis
foreclosed consideration of the broader and more relevant issue
raised by the facts of Ofshe. The controlling issue is not one of
tainted evidence due to government intrusion into the attorneyclient relationship.64 Rather, more subtle and grave constitutional
concerns are generated when the government acts in concert
with the criminal defense attorney to the detriment of the
defendant's representation. The court's primary focus on the
government's activity in a vacuum, rather than on the compelling
constitutional implications of the combined activity of Glass and
the government, circumvented any complete and thorough analysis
of Ofshe's sixth amendment challenge.

C. Attorney Conflict of Interest
A third aspect of the sixth amendment right to counsel is
analogous to the maxim that "no man may serve two masters."65
A legal corollary to this maxim is that no attorney can effectively

62. Oishe. 817 F.2d at 1515.
63.Id.
64. Id.
65. Matthew 6:24.
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serve competing interests.66 The validity of sixth amendment
attorney conflict of interest claims is judged by the Supreme
Court's standard enunciated in Cuyler v. Sullivan.67
In Cuyler, John Sullivan and two co-defendants were represented
by two privately retained attorneys in separate murder trials. 68
Sullivan was tried first. At the close of the state's case, the
defense rested without presentation of any evidence. Consequently,
Sullivan was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment based
on circumstantial evidence. 69 The Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit granted Sullivan's habeas corpus petition, holding that
the joint representation by Sullivan's defense counsel evidenced
"a possible conflict of interest."7o
Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed, stating that a
possible conflict does not establish a sixth alllendment violation.71
The Cuyler standard mandates an actual conflict of interest
resulting in the attorney's adverse performance.72 Significantly,
the Court also emphasized that "a defendant who shows that a
conflict of interest actually affected the adequacy of his
representation, need not demonstrate prejudice in order to obtain
relief."73
There has been some disagreement among lower courts as to
whether the Cuyler test is satisfied once an actual conflict of
interest has been established or whether the test requires
additional proof establishing that the conflict resulted in an
inability of the attorney to effectively represent his client.74 One
important factor distinguishing the Cuyler standard from that of
Morrison and Strickland is clear, however. The Cuyler test does
66. See Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 (1978). The Court held that "requiring an
attorney to represent two codefendants whose interests were in conflict [denies] one of
the defendants his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel." ld. at
481.
67. 446 U.S. 335 (1980).
68. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. at 337.
69. !d. at 338.
70. !d. at 340.
71. ld. at 348.
72.ld.
73. ld. at 349-50 (emphasis added).
74. Compare Baty v. Balkcom, 661 F.2d 391, 397 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981) ("[T]he standard
imposed by the Supreme Court in Cuyler is met by proof of an actual conflict of interest.")
with Parker v. Parratt, 662 F.2d 479, 483-84 (8th Cir. 1981) (The Cuyler standard
mandates evidence of both an actual conflict of interest and adverse effect.).
For a thorough discussion of the varying interpretations by the lower courts of the
Cayit r standard, see Note, Conflicts of Interest in the RepresentatWn of Multiple Criminal
Defend(mts: ClarUying Cuyler v. Sullivan, 70 GEO. L.J. 1527 (1982).
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not require the defendant to further bear the burden of proving
how this conflict actually prejudiced him. The prejudice is
presumed.75 The Strickland Court, in distinguishing ineffective
assistance of counsel claims from conflict of interest claims,
articulated the necessity for presuming prejudice in the latter:
[When an attorney is burdened by an actual conflict of interest,] counsel breaches the duty of loyalty, perhaps the most
basic of counsel's duties. Moreover, it is difficult to measure
the precise effect on the defense of representation corrupted
by conflicting interests. Given the obligation of counsel to
avoid conflicts of interest and the ability of trial courts to
make early inquiry in certain situations likely to give rise to
conflicts . . . it is reasonable for the criminal justice system
to maintain a fairly rigid rule of presumed prejudice for
conflicts of interest.76

It would have been more appropriate for the court of appeals
to base the Ojshe opinion upon the Cuyler premise that an actual
conflict of interest results in presumed prejudice.77 Glass' actions
were designed to mitigate his own pending criminal culpability
and arguably created such a gross distortion between the concepts
of loyalty to the client and loyalty to one's own best interests
that an inherent conflict of interest arose at the inception of the
"deal" struck between Glass and Turow.78 This conflict constituted
a continuing and blatant violation of Ofshe's fundamental sixth
amendment rights that could not be remedied once it occurred.
Inexplicably, the Ojshe court devoted scant attention to the
conflict of interest issue in its opinion and did no more than
75. Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 349.
76. Strickland v. Washington, 446 U.s. 668, 692 (1984). Other courts have also empha·
sized the constitutional status of an attorney's loyalty to his client. See, e.g., United States
v. Alvarez, 580 F.2d 1251, 1254 (5th Cir. 1978) ("Undivided loyalty and fidelity of
commitment is therefore the guiding principle in this important area of Sixth Amendment
jurisprudence.").
77. The conflict of interest aspect of a sixth amendment claim is perhaps the least
tested with respect to the peculiar facts of OjsM. Most cases have dealt with issues of
multiple or joint representation of defendants. See, e.g., Cuyler, 446 U.S. 335 (multiple
representation issue implicated when two privately retained attorneys represented three
criminal co-defendants jointly); Alvarez, 580 F.2d 1251 (attorney's multiple representation
of defendant and two co-defendants who turned government witnesses at trial created
actual conflict of interest); lllinois v. Washington, 101 m. 2d 104, 461 N.E.2d 393 (1984)
(application of Cuyler actual conflict of interest standard restricted to multiple representation cases).
78. OjsM, 817 F.2d at 1511. Ironically, Glass' egregious methods appear to have served
him little. He was convicted of the criminal charges he had tried to mitigate and was
sentenced to eight years in prison. Berg, supra note 3, at 2, col. 3.
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tacitly acknowledge that Glass did indeed have a significant
conflict of interest.79 The court did not consider whether this,
the strongest of Ofshe's claims, merited a presumption of prejudice
and a subsequent dismissal of his conviction, nor did the court
refer to the Cuyler case or its historical predecessors.80
The government's action in aiding and encouraging a criminal
defense attorney to betray his loyalty to his client concurrent
with that attorney's acquiescence jeopardizes the criminal
defendant's constitutional guarantee of effective counsel.S1 This
issue is especially significant in Ofshe because the court declined
to address what could be a paradigm example of an actual conflict
of interest. This failure by the court raises grave constitutional
concerns for potential judicial erosion of the attorney-client
relationship. &2
79. O/she. 817 F.2d at 1516.
80. Predecessors of Cuyler include Holloway v. Arkansas. 435 U.S. 475 (1978) and
Glasser v. United States. 315 U.S. 60 (1942). One could argue that the standards of Cuyler
do not apply to O/she as Cuyler and its predecessors addressed the conflict of interest
issue in multiple representation cases. However. a significant number of courts addressing
a variety of conflict of interest issues have applied the Cuyler standard outside the genre
of multiple representation cases. See. e.g.• Wood v. Georgia. 450 U.S. 261 (1981) (conflict
exists when attorney representing defendant employees was retained and paid by employer whose interests conflicted with those of his employees); United States v. Cancilla.
725 F.2d 867 (2d Cir. 1984) (conflict of interest arose when defense counsel was implicated
in criminal activity similar to that for which his client was being tried); Solina v. United
States. 709 F.2d 160 (2d Cir. 1983) (inherent conflict of interest found when defense
counsel failed to inform defendant that counsel had never passed a required state bar
examination); United States v. Knight. 680 F.2d 470 (6th Cir. 1982) (defense counsel
implicated in theft of documents during defendant's trial); United States v. Hearst. 638
F.2d 1190 (9th Cir. 1980) (conflict claim centered on allegation that defense counsel
pursued his own interest in publication rights rather than defendant's interest in acquittal).
Further. as recently as 1984. Justice Rehnquist. in a strongly worded dissent to a
denial of certiorari. argued that the Dlinois Supreme Court erred in interpreting Cuyler
as applying only to those cases involving multiple representation of defendants and stated
that. as evidenced by lower court decisions. proper application of Cuyler was not so
limited. See TIlinois v. Washington. 101 TIl. 2d 104. 461 N.E.2d 393. cert. denied. 469 U.S.
1022 (1984) (Rehnquist. J •• dissenting). Justice Rehnquist argued that the proper standard
to apply in conflict of interest cases was an issue which should be addressed by the
Supreme Court. !d. at 1022. In this context. it is interesting to note that a writ of
certiorari for Ofthe was denied on November 30. 1987. Ofshe v. United States. 108 S. Ct.
451 (1987).
81. See Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668. 688 (1984). ("Counsel's function is to
assist the defendant. and hence counsel owes the client a duty of loyalty. a duty to avoid
conflicts of interest.").
82. Commentators have noted the emergence of a judicial trend allowing intrusions
upon the historically safeguarded attorney-client relationship. See. e.g.• Falsgraf. A Dangerous Wedge Between Lawyer and Client. 72 A.B.A. J. 8 (1986) (discussing the increase
of grand jury subpoenas to criminal defense attorneys!; Merkle & Moscarino. Are Prose-
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Application of the Cuyler standard to the facts of Ojshe may
have resulted in the court's reconsideration of its conclusion that
"Ofshe suffered no prejudice."83 Cuyler's premise is that no
demonstration of prejudice is required once the "mixed question
of law and fact"84 establishes that an actual conflict of interest
has adversely affected an attorney's ability to represent his client
loyally and zealously. The court should have followed this analysis
to determine whether the concerted actions of attorney Glass
and the government affected Ofshe's sixth amendment rights.
Concededly, because of the insidious nature of the combined
actions of Glass and the government, it would be nearly impossible
to pinpoint any concrete action which actually prejudiced Ofshe.85
Under the rationale of Cuyler, however, it is not necessary to do
SO.86

Although the claims of attorney conflict of interest and
ineffective assistance of counsel are governed by two separate
Supreme Court standards,87 they are intertwined to the extent
that a finding of an actual conflict of interest will necessarily
affect the ability of ail attorney to represent his client effectively.88
An ineffective assistance of counsel claim therefore merits serious
scrutiny if the facts, as they did in Ojshe, also indicate an inherent
conflict of interest. It is uncertain why the Eleventh Circuit
cutors Invading the Attorney·Client Relationship? 71 A.B.A. J. 38. 38 (1985) (analyzing the
implications of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 which "increased the
government's power to seek forfeiture of attorney's fees and all other assets" received
as payment by criminal defense attorneys).
83. Ofshe. 817 F.2d at 1515.
84. Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668. 698 (1984) (quoting Cuyler. 446 U.S. at
342).
85. Because the Strickland and Morrison tests require demonstrable prejudice. any
claim by Ofshe utilizing either test alone would probably have failed. In the instant case.
although Glass' representation of Ofshe was poisoned throughout. it would be difficult to
isolate one tangible action that the court could readily identify as demonstrating actual
prejudice.
86. Courts had recognized this constitutional premise prior to Cuyler. As the Ninth
Circuit noted: "Unlike competency of representation. where an attorney's conduct may
fall anywhere along a continuum ranging from the incompetent to the superlative. conflict·
laden representation is not susceptible of such fine gradations. Such representation is
invidious. often escaping detection on review. and is tantamount to a denial of counsel
itself." United States v. Mouzin. 785 F.2d 682. 703 (9th Cir. 1986) (quoting United States
v. Alvarez. 580 F.2d 1251. 1256-57 (5th Cir. 1978)).
87. See supra notes 34 & 73 and accompanying text.
88. The converse does not necessarily hold true. An ineffective assistance of counsel
claim does not always turn upon whether a conflict of interest existed. It is when an
actual conflict of interest results in a continuing adverse impact on the defense that such
claim exacts thorough examination by the court.
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ignored this analysis. The conflict of interest issue appears to
represent Ofshe's strongest challenge.89 Ofshe's Petition for
Certiorari emphasized the constitutional concerns raised by the
appellate court's dismissal of the claim that Glass' conflict of
interest had a chilling effect on Ofshe's defense.90 As stated in
the court's opinion, Glass' actions were tainted with self-interest
and deceit almost from the inception of his representation of
Ofshe.91
Obviously, any delay on Glass' part in bringing Ofshe's case to
trial correlated to the possibility of delaying his own imminent
criminal indictment. Glass had local counsel, Black, file numerous
motions for continuance and instructed his client, Ofshe, to execute
waivers of his right to a speedy tria1.92 Glass' actions had the
effect of delaying Ofshe's case considerably.
Because of this delay, Ofshe's case reached trial after the
Supreme Court created an entirely new exception for search and
seizure cases.93 Arguably, Ofshe would have had a reasonable
probability of prevailing on his motion to suppress if his case
had been decided earlier .94
Ofshe's local counsel, Black, contended that the facts of Ofshe
uniquely demonstrate how a client's interests can be prejudiced
89. See O./she, 817 F.2d at 1515-16.
90. Petition for Certiorari at 11, United States v. Ofshe, 817 F.2d 1508 (11th Cir.) (No.
87-407), cert. dRnied, 108 S. Ct. 451 (1987):
The Court of Appeals glossed over the major issue in the case-it does not
matter what prejudice the defendant could prove. The error was fundamental
and of far greater import than the incarceration of one defendant. No client
should ever have to fear that his own lawyer intends to harm him for that
lawyer's own personal gain.
/d.

91. Ofshe, 817 F.2d at 1511.
92. !d.

93. In United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), the Court set forth a "good faith
exception" to the exclusionary rule governing unconstitutional searches and seizures.
Prior to Leon, the evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search conducted pursuant to
a facially valid warrant was subject to exclusion. Subsequent to Leon, evidence obtained
under a constitutionally deficient warrant is not excluded provided the officer acted in
good faith in execution of a facially valid warrant.
According to Ofshe's local counsel, Melvin Black, the Leon holding adversely affected
Ofshe because it "gutted the motion to suppress," and caused Ofshe's case to conclude
differently than it would have had his case gone to trial in a timely manner. Berg, supra
note 3, at 2, col. 3.
94. Ofshe's strongest fourth amendment contentions, that the search warrant was
unconstitutional due to lack of probable cause and failure to describe the location to be
searched with particularity, are rendered moot in the wake of Leon's good faith exception.
See Berg, supra note 3, at 2, col. 3.
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inherently by an actual conflict of interest on the part of his
attorney.95 In his Writ of Certiorari, Ofshe contended that the
court of appeals' failure to address the overwhelming evidence
of a conflict of interest foreshadows a judicial breakdown of the
sixth amendment right to counsel protections.96 When a client
must question not only whether his attorney is acting in the
client's best interests but, more egregiously, whether the attorney,
with the government's aid and encouragement, is in fact
"representing" his client for the purpose of advancing the
attorney's best interests, the fundamental framework of protection
upon which the sixth amendment right to counsel rests is
completely undermined.
II.

FIFTH AMENDMENT ISSUES

The fifth amendment provides in part that "[n]o person shall
be ... deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law."97 Ofshe's second contention on appeal was that "the
government's conduct in invading the communications between
him and Glass was so outrageous that it violated his Fifth
Amendment due process rights."98 Although few Supreme Court
decisions address the dismissal of a criminal conviction because
of outrageous government conduct in violation of the fifth
amendment, the Supreme Court discussed the issue in United
States v. Russell. 99 In Russell, the Court rejected the defense of
entrapment stating that the case did not fall within the scope of
95. Petition for Certiorari at 9, United States v. Ofshe, 817 F.2d 1508 (11th Cir.) (No.
cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 451 (1987) ("A defendant's attorney has a clearly defined
and crucial role in the administration of justice, to-wit: to provide advocacy to the citizen
accused in the adversary system of trial. That role is literally destroyed when the defense
attorney becomes an agent of the prosecution.").
96. [d.
Although the court of appeals indicated that it would not "condone" such
conduct, it provided no remedy to deter future prosecutors from that conduct
. . . . If prosecutors are free to use defense attorneys as informants against
their clients, irreparable and fatal damage will be done to the delicate balance
between the functions of the defense and the prosecution in making the
criminal justice system work.
[d.
97. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
98. OiSM, 817 F.2d at 1516.
99. 411 U.S. 423 (1973). See also Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484 (1976)
(defendant predisposed to committing crime of selling heroin could not claim that his fifth
amendment due process rights were violated as a result of entrapment by government
agents acting in concert with defendant!.
87-407),
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outrageous government conduct implicating due process
principles. lOo However, the Court noted that future actions of
"law enforcement agents" could conceivably constitute conduct
which would fall within this context and "would absolutely bar
the government from invoking judicial processes to obtain a
conviction."lIl1 Although the Russell Court recognized outrageous
government conduct as a legal defense, the Court required the
defendant to show that the challenged government conduct
violated "that 'fundamental fairness, shocking to the universal
sense of justice,' mandated by the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment."lo2 Once a defendant has established that
government action falls within the judicial definition of "outrageous
conduct," this alone is sufficient to justify dismissal.103
Ofshe contended that the government's conduct in his case did
violate that "fundamental fairness, shocking to the universal
sense of justice," articulated by the Supreme Court in Russell.104
In rejecting Ofshe's claim, the Eleventh Circuit nevertheless
stressed that its opinion was restricted solely to the facts before
it and, further, that the court did not condone the government's
conduct. !Os Additionally, the court refused Turow's demand to
delete any reference to and subsequent recommendation regarding
Turow's "reprehensible" behavior from its published opinion. 106
100. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 431-32 (1973). The Court noted that the
defendant's possible predisposition to unlawfully manufacture and sell methamphetamine
seriously undercut his claim of entrapment. Id. at 432.
101. !d.
102. !d. at 432 (quoting Kinsella v. United States ex rei. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234, 246
(1960)).
103. !d. at 431-32.
104. Ofshe, 817 F.2d at 1516.
105. !d. The court went so far as to suggest that Glass' and Turow's behavior was so
"reprehensible" as to merit further investigation, as evidenced by the court's inclusion
in its opinion of the address, complete with zip code, of the Attorney Registration and
Disciplinary Commission of illinois, implicitly directing the district judge to pursue the
matter further. !d. at n.6.
106. Appellee's Motion to Amend Panel Opinion, United States v. Ofshe, 817 F.2d 1508
(11th Cir. 1987) (No. 86·5351). The court further expressed its concern that Turow's actions
may have constituted an obstruction of justice under 18 U.S.C. § 1503 (1982):
In this case, the foreseeable result of Turow's conduct was that Glass'
representation of Ofshe would be rendered ineffective. Indeed, Turow's own
testimony reveals that he subjectively foresaw that very result . . . .
In our opinion •.. Turow should have reasonably foreseen that the natural
and probable consequence of the success of his scheme to monitor Ofshe's
conversations with Glass would be to impede the due administration of
justice in violation of section 1503. When a federal court becomes aware of
conduct that may be criminal, it is duty bound to alert the appropriate
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Arguably, a flaw in the court's reasoning is that it again
circumvented the broader constitutional implications of Ofshe by
limiting itself within its narrow analysis. Future fifth and sixth
amendment violation claims may be endangered should the court
of appeals' ruling be interpreted as upholding the government's
conduct in actively encouraging defense attorneys to become
informants against their own clients. Io7 Had the court focused on
this issue, the government's activity might well have been held
violative of due process if for no other reason than that the
"dismissal of an indictment because of deliberate governmental
misconduct [can be] used as a prophylactic tool for discouraging
future actions of the same nature."IOS
The Supreme Court generally recognizes that the due process
clause limits government actions which violate a protected right
of the defendanU09 Because the government's actions in Ofshe
were characterized as "reprehensible"llo with no further
elaboration, it is difficult to discern what fine gradation caused
these same actions to fall short of outrageous conduct. The court
of appeals appears content to premise its decision upon a summary
finding that, despite the deplorable actions of the government,
Ofshe suffered no prejudice.l l l Curiously, the two Supreme Court
authorities.
ld. at 10, 12-13. But cf. Uviller, Presumed Guilty: The COUl·t of Appeals Versus Scott
Turow, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1879 (1988), a thoughtful analysis focusing on the Eleventh
Circuit's panel opinion censuring Turow and raising the spectre of his possible criminal
behavior in the Ofshe case. Professor Uviller eventually concludes that Glass did labor
"under an unethical conflict of interest," but takes issue with the court's proposition that
Glass' "dereliction [should] be attributed to Turow." !d. at 1894.
In further support of his analysis, Professor Uviller notes that Turow was acting "in
accord with the policy of his office and the Department of Justice," the latter recently
having "informed Mr. Turow that the matter would not be presented to a grand jury."
ld. at 1901 n.64. The troubling question, of course, is whether such a departmental policy
itself violates the sixth amendment right to counsel.
107. This concern is raised and stated succinctly in Ofshe's Petition for Certiorari: "It
is imperative that the sanction of dismissal be prescribed as the remedy to deter
prosecutors from converting defense attorneys into informants against their own clients."
Petition for Certiorari at 8, United States v. Ofshe, 817 F.2d 1508 (11th Cir.) (No. 87-407),
cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 457 (1987).
108. United States v. Houghton, 554 F.2d 1219, 1224 (1st Cir. 1971). The government's
continued recalcitrance in failing to divulge information about informants to defense
counsel was held not to constitute outrageous conduct. Taken as a whole, the Court found
the government acted with "due diligence." ld. at 1224-25.
109. Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 490 (1976). Note, however, that the Court
does not elaborate on what type or extent of a protected right must be violated before
the limits of the due process clause come into play.
110. Ofshe, 817 F.2d at 1516 n.6.
111. ld.
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cases articulating the due process defense of "outrageous
government conduct" do not require a defendant to demonstrate
prejudice; outrageous conduct alone is sufficient to justify
dismissa1.1l2 In Ojshe, it would appear that the court of appeals
did in fact find the government's conduct outrageous but not
sufficiently outrageous to merit dismissal of the case against
Ofshe.
Courts have long recognized that the motivating force behind
the due process clause is the promotion of fundamental fairness
in government procedures.1l3 Thus, due process was intended to
protect individuals from the very type of egregious government
conduct suffered by Ofshe. ll4 Inherent in the court of appeals'
disposition of O/she is this pivotal question: In the long run, does
the court's decision promote or deter due process protections?
There being nothing recondite about the court's analysis, the
latter proposition would appear to be true. The constitutional
precept of fundamental fairness in government procedures is
strained to support an opinion such as O/she.
CONCLUSION

There are serious flaws in the O/she decision with respect to
fifth and sixth amendment issues. Most significantly, the court's
failure to consider Ofshe's claims under the Strickland and the
Cuyler tests appears to leave wide gaps in the court's analysis.
Ofshe met the first prong of the Strickland test. The court
acknowledged that Glass' representation of Ofshe was ineffective.
Yet, inexplicably, the court failed to reference the Strickland
standard in its opinion. Although it is uncertain whether Ofshe
could have proved that this ineffective representation prejudiced
his defense, this was a pertinent issue which merited thorough
discussion by the court.
Additionally, the court's omission of any discussion of the
Cuyla standard in its analysis of Glass' conflict of interest is
112. See United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 432 (1973); Hampron, 425 U.S. 484, 490.
113. See, e.g., Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 162 (1951)
!Due process represents "a profound attitude of fairness between man and man, and more
particularly between the individual and government."); Pedersen v. South Williamsport
Area School Dist., 677 F.2d 312, 317 (3d Cir. 1982) ("Essentially, fundamental fairness is
what due process means."); Gibbany v. Department of Corrections, 415 F. Supp. 1117,
1121 (W.D. Okla. 1976) ("The touchstone of due process is fundamental fairness.").
114. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 462 (1942) ("Due process of law is secured against
invasion by the federal Government by the Fifth Amendment and is safeguarded against
state action in identical words by the Fourteenth.").
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surprising. Whether the facts of Ofshe could ultimately support
a valid conflict of interest claim is debatable. However, the court's
recognition that Ofshe's attorney had such conflicting interests
would appear to mandate application of Cuyler.
In its analysis of both the fifth and sixth amendment claims,
the court stressed repeatedly that its holding was limited to the
unique facts of Ofshe. Ultimately, however, this rationale proves
fatal to the court's opinion.
The issue of concurrent attorney and government conduct in
this case transcends the conviction of a single criminal defendant.
This decision potentially will influence future actions by the
government and by criminal defense counsel by defining broad
parameters within which overzealous government officials and
less-than-Ioyal defense attorneys may function. The precepts of
the fifth and sixth amendments are too fundamental to our system
of justice to be sacrificed to the type of "ends justifying means"
mentality evidenced in Ofshe.
A client's justified belief in his attorney's undivided loyalty
should never be compromised by the actions of the government
in converting that attorney into a government informant against
his own client. The grave constitutional transgressions of the
attorney and the government in Ofshe should mandate that these
facts, as a matter of law, establish an actual conflict of interest
giving rise to a per se presumption of prejudice, thus relieving
the defendant of the burden of proving actual prejudice. Such a
presumption is required when, as here, the combined actions of
the government and the attorney produce a representation of a
criminal defendant that is irreparably tainted with deceit, selfinterest and disloyalty. There can be no true representation
within constitutional parameters by counsel in such circumstances.
The charges against Ofshe should have been dismissed in order
to salvage what dignity of the law is left in this particularly
egregious situation.

Cathy Bradl Peterson
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